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ABSTRACT: This article reviews the electoral accountability dimension as a constitutive mechanism of Par-
aguayan democracy since 1989, analyzing the factors that limit the representation contained in the admin-
istration of the Paraguayan government as a result of the electoral process. We provide an analytic con-
trast between the democratic principles that guide the Paraguayan electoral institutions and the way their 
designs are enforced, identifying the gap between formal and informal rules as determinants of political 
representation. We also describe the barriers that prevent effective access of the population to political 
participation and competition, the advantages possessed by traditional political parties and interest 
groups, as well as their implications for democracy. We also review the degree to which elected officials 
are representative of historically excluded social groups as a result, emphasizing the way women, indige-
nous and peasant communities have potentially limited power to exercise political influence due to limita-
tions to participation by structural and institutional factors.  
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1. Introduction 
 
The overthrow of the military regime that took place in Paraguay in 1989 marked the 
outset of transition towards democracy in the country. Regime change was material-
ized institutionally after a new National Constitution was drafted in 1992, inscribing 
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principles of civil, political and social citizenship (Marshall 1998) in Paraguayan positive 
law, in coincidence with the values of a representative democracy that began to be 
practiced. However, observance of such constitutional designs has been irregular 
throughout the democratization years, in light of the uneven levels of compliance 
shown by the consecutive civilian governments and the irregular quality of democracy 
perceivable in its different dimensions (Morlino 2011; 2014).  
Detailed analysis about the quality of democracy in Paraguay (Barreda and Bou 
2010; Abente-Brun 2007, 2012; Duarte-Recalde 2015) indicate that this regime is char-
acterized by deficiencies in all of its dimensions1, which ultimately comes to erode its 
legitimacy. Challenges facing the democratically elected governments after decades of 
dictatorial rule included “a socially exclusive development trajectory, an authoritarian 
tradition with associated weak civil society, judicial corruption and impunity for wrong-
doers, and low levels of transparency and accountability” (Nickson 2011, 11).  
However, the character of the Paraguayan political system can be stated as demo-
cratic from a procedural standpoint as it has allowed the regular replacement of public 
officials through minimally free and fair electoral processes, though party alternation 
on the executive power –as a key determinant of democracy, since “a regime should 
not be classified as democratic if it fills executive and legislative offices by elections, 
but the ruling party never loses elections” (Przeworski et al. 2000, 27)– was only 
achieved in 2008. The Superior Court of Electoral Justice has performed as an autono-
mous institution, organizing elections throughout the country in a regular and predict-
able manner since 19982 (Martini 2003, Duarte-Recalde 2015). There has also been 
freedom of party organization as well as presence and stability of political alternatives 
throughout the period. Thus, electoral accountability as a process through which “the 
voter decides and either rewards the incumbent candidate or slate of candidates with a 
vote in their favor, or else punishes them by voting for another candidate, abstaining 
from the vote, or by nullifying the ballot” (Morlino 2011, 200) appears as the dimen-
sion of highest democratic quality in the Paraguayan political system, followed closely 
by participation and competition (Morlino 2014, 59).  
On the other hand, the electoral processes in this country have also been character-
ized by deficient compliance with the rules. Electoral integrity has been questioned re-
 
1 Following Leonardo Morlino (2011, 2014), we understand that the democratic dimensions or qualities 
necessary to assess the regime include procedural dimensions (rule of law, electoral and inter-institutional 
accountability, participation and competition), substantive dimensions (freedoms and equality) and gov-
ernment responsiveness. 
2 The 1996 municipal elections organized by this institution have been considered the first effectively 
democratic elections in the history of the country (Martini 2003, 181). 
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peatedly (Duarte-Recalde 2015) and, while lack of full compliance with democratic pro-
cedures has not fundamentally altered “the playing field between government and op-
position” (Levitsky and Way 2002, 53), access to electoral competition systematically 
excludes social sectors poorly represented by traditional parties, which challenges the 
legitimate origin and level of representation of elected officials. Taking into considera-
tion literature indicating that “Institutions do not necessarily function as intended (…) 
but they are essential for establishing accountability” (Mainwaring and Welna 2003, 5), 
that “many Latin American democracies are characterized by weak institutional envi-
ronments in which enforcement of the rules is low (…)” (Levitsky and Murillo 2013, 93), 
and that infringement of formal rules may be due to their limited relevance or lack 
thereof to influence behaviors and processes, or they may show the relevance of such 
rules as facades to achieve other political objectives (Acuña and Chudovsky 2013), we 
now propose to revise that gap between the formal design of electoral rules and their 
effective enforcement in the Paraguayan case. We do so in order to assess the demo-
cratic character of political representation in Paraguay, looking into the nature of gov-
ernment oversight by the citizens. 
This article explores the boundaries of electoral governance in Paraguay beyond the 
system's institutional design. In order to review the extent to which electoral rules are 
enforced impartially and allow for effective electoral participation and competition of 
the population, we take into consideration testimony of political actors that don't be-
long to traditional political parties but who have been involved in the public sphere 
through means of unconventional political participation during the democratization pe-
riod3, exercising their freedom of speech and association to channel interests of tradi-
tionally excluded social sectors, to enhance their political agency, and to promote con-
ditions that could alter the balance of social forces and public perceptions regarding 
their demands (Carter 2012, 98). In this regard, we will examine the institutional con-
straints established by the Constitution and electoral laws that shape competition and 
participation, contrasting them with the perception of their enforcement by social 
groups that claim not to be fully represented in the electoral process, exploring the gap 
 
3 In order to achieve such goal we did semi-structured interviews with key informants. These inform-
ants were selected based on their work as representatives of social interests that have remained excluded 
from electoral competition, but whose claims have had notoriety during the democratization period and 
have influenced the national political agenda through means of unconventional political participation. The 
full transcripts of the interviews done to Gabriela Schvartzman (Kuña Pyrenda Political Movement), Daniel 
Gómez (SUNU Group of Intercultural Action) and Eladio Flecha (Paraguay Pyahura Party) are available in 
the database of the organization “Semillas para la Democracia” and the United States Agency for Interna-
tional Development (USAID), as part of the Civil Society Project “Topu'ã Paraguay”, which funded the re-
port that precedes this article. 
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between participatory democratic principles de jure and their compliance de facto. We 
will also examine how the main organized social sectors of the country remain discrim-
inated against through such ineffective enforcement, contesting the possibility of sub-
stantive representation and its democratic nature. 
 
 
2. Paraguayan electoral system 
 
The workings of the Paraguayan electoral system, understood as “the way voters 
express their political preference by means of votes and the way these votes are trans-
ferred into executive posts such as the presidential office or legislative mandates in the 
form of parliamentary seats” (Nohlen 2005, 1-2), are defined in the 1992 Paraguayan 
Constitution and the legislation that regulates its designs. Paraguay is established con-
stitutionally as a rule of law that assumes representative, participatory and pluralist 
democracy as its form of government (National Constitution, Art. 1). This Constitution 
also designs the Electoral Justice as the institution responsible for convening, judging, 
organizing, directing and supervising the acts and issues arising from general, depart-
mental and municipal elections, as well as the rights and titles of those who are elect-
ed. Also falling within its competence are questions arising from all kinds of popular 
consultation, as well as questions relating to elections and the functioning of political 
parties and movements (National Constitution, Art. 273). The functioning of the Elec-
toral Justice is regulated by the Law 635/95. 
The Paraguayan Electoral Code establishes that voting is a right, duty and public re-
sponsibility that empowers the elector to participate in the selection of elective au-
thorities through political parties or alliances (Law 834/96, Art. 1). It indicates that no 
one can prevent, restrict or disturb the exercise of suffrage, and that the authorities 
are obliged to guarantee the freedom and transparency of the suffrage and facilitate its 
exercise (Law 834/96, Art. 3). It is established that the vote is universal, free, direct, 
equal, secret, personal and non-transferable, as well as being an obligation for all quali-
fied citizens (Law 834/96, Art. 4). Paraguayan citizens and foreigners residing perma-
nently in the national territory who have reached eighteen years of age may act as vot-
ers (Law 834/96, Art. 2). By the Constitutional Amendment approved through Referen-
dum on October 9, 2011, Paraguayans living abroad are also voters. 
In Paraguay, two rounds of elections are held every five years: a) general elections, 
where the President and Vice President of the Republic, the Deputies, Senators, MER-
COSUR Parliamentarians, Governors and members of the Departmental Council are 
elected; and b) municipal elections, where the Mayor and members of the Municipal 
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Council are elected. In case of a constitutional reform, Constitutional Constituents shall 
also be elected by direct vote.  
The President and Vice-President are elected jointly and directly by the people, by 
simple majority of votes in general elections. The Senate is composed of forty-five titu-
lar members directly elected in a single national constituency on a proportional basis. 
The Chamber of Deputies consists of eighty titular members directly elected by the 
people in departmental constituencies on a proportional basis. The Governors and the 
Departmental Councils are elected by direct vote of the citizens residing in the respec-
tive departments. The Mayors and the Municipal Councils are elected in direct suffrage 
by the legally qualified voters in each jurisdiction. For each election, voters cast one 
vote (ballot) separately for executive and legislative posts, while all collegiate bodies 
are elected through closed lists presented by each competing party or movement. 
Understanding that the size of the constituency can influence political representa-
tion, the structure of the party system and power relations (Nohlen 2007, 15), the dif-
ferent sizes of electoral constituencies present in the Paraguayan system generate var-
ying effects on its proportionality as, the smaller the electoral circumscription, the 
smaller the proportional effect of the electoral system and the opportunities for small 
parties to access legislative positions will be. 
Legislation does not allow for presidential re-election, which inevitably limits the 
temporal horizons of the executive branch. Legislation doesn't contemplate the proce-
dure of ballotage either, which facilitates control of the executive branch by the tradi-
tionally majoritarian party that uninterruptedly controlled the government and State's 
resources from 1954 through 2008: the National Republican Association (Asociación 
Nacional Republicana – ANR) (Abente 2007; Duarte-Recalde 2015).  
Despite such procedural conditioning, however, the workings of the electoral system 
remain closer to that of a polyarchy (Dahl 1971) and distant from an electoral authori-
tarianism, where rulers “devise discriminatory electoral rules, exclude opposition par-
ties and candidates from entering the electoral arena, infringe upon their political 
rights and civil liberties, restrict their access to mass media and campaign finance, im-
pose formal or informal suffrage restrictions on their supporters, coerce or corrupt 
them into deserting the opposition camp, or simply redistribute votes and seats 
through electoral fraud” (Schedler 2006, 3). The conditioning elements to democratic 
representation in Paraguay can be attributed, instead, to the irregular enforcement 
and weak oversight of democratic procedures, as well as the systemic discrimination of 
traditionally disadvantaged social groups, that define the system's low democratic 
quality yet allows it to be considered an electoral democracy.  
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3. Conventional participation as a determinant of representation 
 
When considering participation as a democratic quality, we understand it comprises 
“the entire set of behaviors, be they conventional or unconventional, legal or border-
line vis-à-vis legality, that allows women and men, as individuals or as groups, to cre-
ate, revive, or strengthen group identification or to try to influence the recruitment of, 
and decisions by, political authorities (the representative and/or governmental ones) in 
order to maintain or change the allocation of existing values” (Morlino 2011). However, 
for the purposes of this paper, we limit the analysis to conventional participation in or-
der to assess the way the electoral process is carried out in the Paraguayan case; the 
electoral process realizes the ideal of political representation in democratic systems, 
while Paraguayan legislation establishes that the exercise the public power through 
suffrage by the people. 
According to the formalistic view of representation that focuses on formal proce-
dures of authorization, elections are “a grant of authority by the voters to the elected 
officials” (Pitkin 1967, 43) that makes representation a transaction that implies “the 
giving and having of authority”, where a representative “is someone who has been au-
thorized to act” (Pitkin 1967, 38). Also, as “elections serve only as one rather ineffec-
tive means for creating or sustaining representation” (Pitkin 1967, 108), a representa-
tive democracy where there's a gap between political representatives and citizens “re-
quires the existence of institutional mechanisms to ensure that such separation does 
not result in unresponsive or illegal governments” (Peruzzoti and Smulovitz 2002) and 
“for procedural democracy to work —and procedures to be meaningful— there must 
be inclusive citizenship, access to the political arena that is open on clear and relatively 
equal lines to individuals and groups, freedom of information and organization, and 
formal as well as informal means of ensuring accountability” (Levine and Molina 2007).  
Furthermore, according to a formalistic view of representation that focuses on for-
mal procedures of accountability where “a representative is someone who is to be held 
to account, who will have to answer to another for what he does” (Pitkin 1967, 55), the 
democratic nature of accountability will be enhanced by the inclusion of diverse inter-
ests and identities of the population to the political system. For this reason it's im-
portant to review the rules that determine the opportunities for participation and 
whether they facilitate or hinder the effective integration of the population to this pro-
cess, advancing towards a pattern of descriptive representation where the group of 
elected authorities “corresponds accurately to that of the whole nation” (Pitkin 1967, 
60). 
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Procedures regarding registration and voting are clear and formally inclusive in the 
Paraguayan political system, although they are not necessarily accessible in practice. All 
Paraguayan citizens are constitutionally allowed to vote and are eligible for public of-
fice after the age of 18, whether they reside in Paraguayan territory or abroad. They 
also have the right to freely associate in political parties or movements in order to elect 
authorities through democratic methods. Automatic enrollment to the Permanent Civic 
Register has been enforced since 20124 (Law 4559/12), but those who turned 18 before 
that year must still register in person at any post of the electoral institution. The insti-
tution responsible for such registration is the Direction of the Electoral Register, which 
is also responsible for the preparation and transparency of the Permanent Civic Regis-
ter and parties' electoral registers (Law 635/95, Art. 26).  
While it's possible for political parties and movements to audit the voter registration 
process through their designated representatives (Law 834/96, Art. 134), this recourse 
has traditionally been abused by parties that possess active officials as members of the 
electoral institution; they would register voters to the Permanent Civic Register while 
simultaneously affiliating them to their party. This practice has created confusion 
among the population that lasted for many years and still endures in parts of the coun-
try, because it led people to believe that in order to vote in general or local elections 
they needed to be affiliated to a political party (Schvartzman 2012). 
Requirement to possess an identification document to register and vote also works 
as a hindrance to participation for many Paraguayans. The only valid document for reg-
istration and voting is the identity card (Law 834/96, Art. 98), which works as discrimi-
natory mechanism in light of the number of people with difficulties to reach the Identi-
fications Department offices or the National Police to apply for this document. This re-
quirement mainly excludes from political participation members of traditionally mar-
ginalized indigenous or rural communities that need to travel long distances and incur 
in expenses to join the electoral process. Their marginal situation is thus reinforced and 
reproduced while exploited by the party machinery, as parties also procure the identity 
cards while they proceed to register and affiliate members as part of the same process 
(Gómez 2012). 
Considering the electoral process as a means to materialize symbolic representation 
(Pitkin 1967), the levels of electoral participation in Paraguay also display the limita-
tions in the representative nature of elected officials. Although voting is compulsory 
(Law 834/96, Art. 1), there is a significant number of people that fail to participate in 
 
4 This has enhanced the number of registered voters in the country, which has increased in large pro-
portion in the last 15 years; from the 2.049.449 registered voters for the 1996 general elections the num-
ber increased to 3.516.275 voters registered in 2013 (Tables 1 and 2 ). 
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elections (Tables 1 y 2) without apparent consequences. The maximum level of elec-
toral turnout for presidential elections since 1998 happened on that year –reaching 
80,54% of participation– while each of the consecutive elections registered participa-
tion levels ranging from 60% to 68%. However, considering participation as a percent-
age of the voting age population, the share that actively elects representatives remains 
over 45% but below 60% for both parliamentary and presidential elections throughout 
the period, so the elected authorities are only representative to about half of the vot-
ing age population in symbolic terms. 
 
Table 1: Voter turnout – Presidential elections 
Year Voter 
Turnout 
Total vote Registra-
tion 
VAP 
Turnout5  
Voting 
age popu-
lation 
Invalid 
votes 
Popula-
tion  
2013 68.02% 2391790 3516275 57.96% 4126948 2.48% 6623252 
2008 60.34% 1726906 2861940 45.94% 3759034 3.50% 6669086 
2003 64.20% 1544172 2405108 47.60% 3243812 3.10% 5884491 
1998 80.54% 1650725 2049449 59.43% 2777725 1.87% 5137440 
Source: International IDEA: http://www.idea.int/vt/countryview.cfm?id=186 
 
Table 2: Voter turnout – Parliamentary elections 
Year 
Voter 
Turnout 
Total vote Registration 
VAP Turn-
out  
Voting age 
population 
Invalid 
votes 
Population  
2013 68.24% 2391790 3516275 58.15% 4126948 2.82% 6623252 
2008 65.48% 1726906 2861940 49.86% 3759034 1.50% 6669086 
2003 64.02% 1544172 2405108 47.47% 3243812 4.30% 5884491 
1998 80.48% 1650725 2049449 59.38% 2777725 3.34% 5137440 
Source: International IDEA: http://www.idea.int/vt/countryview.cfm?id=186 
 
From the point of view of symbolic representation that values the meaning attribut-
ed to a representative by the population to be represented, the response invoked by 
the contending candidates in terms of voter turnout appears as an indicator of the lim-
ited degree to which the Paraguayan population feels represented by them. The level 
of low trust and apparent disenchantment of the Paraguayan population with the elec-
toral practice is also reflected in the statement “No one chooses through the system 
election in our country (...) and for us the electoral issue, under these conditions, is a 
trap” (Flecha 2012). The situation is worsened when acknowledging that the legacy of 
 
5 Voter turnout as the percentage of the voting age population that actually cast a ballot. 
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the dictatorial regime is still perceivable and that “powerful elite groups that had 
emerged during the dictatorship jostled to retain their power in the new democratic 
environment, often through buying congressional votes” (Nickson 2010, 286).  
Meanwhile, the level of electoral participation that remains stable is linked to the 
action of political parties with strong clientelistic bases capable to mobilize their voters 
on election day. The Survey “Indicadores de Gobernabilidad Democrática en Paraguay” 
on governance, democracy and transparency carried out by the United Nations Devel-
opment Programme regarding the general elections of 2008 indicated that 25% of vot-
ers were taken to their polling stations by political operators, increasing to 41% of vot-
ers among the population under the extreme poverty line (PNUD 2009, 33). This situa-
tion is also reflected in the experience of indigenous communities in the sense that 
“there is a high percentage of people from different communities that are going to 
vote –attendance to vote reaches almost 90%, if not more– who are taken by political 
candidates; they call them voter hauling and it's done almost at the community level” 
(Gómez 2012). Throughout the period of time under analysis there had been several 
cases of indigenous voters retained under lock for days before the elections, until they 
are taken to vote on election day and only freed afterwards, particularly in the coun-
try's northern region (GAT 2013). 
The country's legislation also promotes the right to vote as a basis for liberal demo-
cratic equality, whereas each person possesses the electoral value of a single ballot. 
Since suffrage is founded on the universal, free, direct, equal and secret vote according 
to the Constitution, vote buying, intimidation or withholding identity documents are 
banned and punishable by law, which could lead to financial penalties or imprisonment 
(Law 834/96, Art. 320 y 321). Such principles also apply to elections in political parties, 
labor and social organizations. However, this legal command is void of content in reali-
ty as such practices take place regularly; cases of vote buying are usual in municipal 
and general elections, which shows the lack of effective enforcement of these electoral 
rules (Duarte-Recalde 2015).  
Furthermore, the most recent general and municipal elections have been character-
ized by cases of malpractice that have included the opening of polling stations without 
the presence of all appointed members, cases of induction to vote and coercion to vot-
ers, retention of identity cards, ballot theft, distortion of electoral data, substitutions of 
one elector for another, carrying weapons, the use of cameras in the darkroom, the 
use of badges to identify party operators, the use of vehicles with electoral propagan-
da, as well as the unofficial disclosure by pollsters and the media of preliminary exit 
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poll data6 (El País 2013; OEA 2015). While detrimental to democratic quality from a 
normative stance, such malpractices that constrain free and equal political participa-
tion are regular traits of the stable electoral process that has characterized Paraguayan 
democracy.  
On a final note about participation as a procedural determinant of representation, 
the very meaning given to political participation is heterogeneous in the Paraguayan 
experience. On the one hand, grassroots movements and certain alternative political 
options have advanced towards deliberative ideals of democracy, as they consider that 
participation is not limited “to cast a vote in the ballot box and stay home afterwards” 
(Flecha 2012). On the other hand, the very notion of participation belongs to a differ-
ent paradigm when it comes to indigenous communities, given that the concept of a 
party as a fragment of society is foreign to the idea of a community, in the sense that 
“politics, religion and production almost go hand in hand” (Gómez 2012). Thus, a dou-
ble limitation is posed to the idea of representation contained in the Paraguayan elec-
toral process: i) although the population is formally empowered to be part of the elec-
toral process, their participation does not necessarily correspond to democratic prem-
ises in practice if the electoral preferences result from direct or indirect pressure from 
political parties and officials, or from the manipulation of the electoral laws or institu-
tions; and ii) the very meaning attached to the electoral process is not culturally repre-
sentative of the entire population of the country, nor it is politically when it is per-
ceived that the system consistently benefits the traditional political interests. 
 
 
4. Competition as a determinant of representation 
 
Political democracy consists of “a system of governance in which rulers are held ac-
countable for their actions in the public realm by citizens, acting indirectly through the 
competition and cooperation of their elected representative” (Schmitter and Karl 1991, 
4). On the other hand, the mere existence of competition is not enough to make a sys-
tem democratic given that it requires competition to be free and fair in order to claim 
the existence of a polyarchy (Dahl 1971). Taking this into consideration we now review 
the main traits of political competition in Paraguay, which arguably exists as long as 
 
6 Although it's not allowed to divulge the result of polls during the voting process identifying the candi-
dates in competition, the media reports such results and tendencies without naming the candidates or us-
ing their nicknames, which often defeats the purpose of protecting the people's right to cast their vote au-
tonomously. 
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“more than one political actor is involved in political decision-making processes” 
(Morlino 2011).  
It's been observed that the number of electoral options in competition has increased 
since the institutional democratic opening, in coincidence with the formal guarantee of 
ideological pluralism and legal equality of political parties (Law 834/96, Art. 14). How-
ever, the composition of Congress resulting from the latest general elections shows a 
system that remains close to an imperfect two-party model7, while the effective num-
ber of parliamentary parties, calculated from the partisan distribution in the Lower 
Chamber, is 2.2 (Table 3). 
 
Table 3: Parliamentary distribution in the year 2015 
Parties Senators Deputies  
Asociación Nacional Republicana (ANR) 19 46 
Partido Liberal Radical Auténtico (PLRA) 13 28 
Frente Guasú (FG) 5 1 
Partido Demócrata Progresista (PDP) 3 - 
Avanza País (AP) 2 2 
Partido Unión Nacional de Ciudadanos Éticos (UNACE) 2  
Partido Encuentro Nacional (PEN) 1 2 
Independents  1 
Source: Duarte-Recalde and González-Ríos (2016) 
 
In addition to the majoritarian effects produced by the D'Hondt method for alloca-
tion of parliamentary seats, the persistence of this historic bipartisanship is greatly ex-
plained by the factual difficulties to establish alternative parties representing the dif-
ferent interests of the population, as well as their eventual access to power, due both 
to formal regulations in this respect as well as to structural factors. 
 
7Asociación Nacional Republicana (ANR) and Partido Liberal Radical Auténtico (PLRA) are the two tradi-
tional Paraguayan parties founded in 1887, two of the oldest political parties in Latin America. Both parties 
succeeded each other in power almost exclusively since the late nineteenth century until 1989, though 
during dictatorship of Stroessner (1954-1989) the ANR became a hegemonic party, exercising  ample terri-
torial presence and control of resources (Abente-Brun 2012; Nickson 2014).  
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The registration of candidates is responsibility of the Electoral Justice. All Paraguayan 
citizens over 18 years old are allowed to compete for office, while they must be over 
25 years old to compete for Deputies and over 35 years old to compete for Senators or 
the Presidency. It is possible for independent candidates to compete, as long as they 
are properly authorized by the electoral institution (Law 834/96, Art. 85). Also, there is 
legal guarantee for political parties to exist, to register and to operate freely (Law 
834/96, Art. 9), which confirms institutionally the democratic and pluralistic nature of 
the Paraguayan party system. There are few restrictions in place to the work of political 
parties, which include the ban to get funding from foreign organizations or States, ad-
vocating violence or threatening the existence of the National Republic or its demo-
cratic nature.  
Despite the legal assurances that allow all candidates to compete for public office, 
admission of new players to the electoral competition has been conditioned by the ac-
tion of agents from traditional parties. Such agents and their parties possess decades of 
experience in the management of the public bureaucracy and the electoral processes, 
and they use that experience to dispute every step the new candidates take –acting as 
stumbling blocks and legally entitled to do so (Schvartzman, 2012)–. They have the 
empirical know-how about the electoral process that gives them an advantage even 
before the competition starts. 
Another determinant of the electoral competition concerns access to electoral re-
sources and their lack of extensive public accountability. Although it has been argued 
that “the corruption of politics by money is a structural feature of democracy in eco-
nomically unequal societies” (Przeworski 2010, 97) assurances of minimum standards 
for equality in terms of party financing and campaign expenditures are key to pursue 
fair electoral competition. Paraguayan legislation stipulates that political parties must 
report their financial statements regularly to the electoral institution (Law 834/96, Art. 
66) and disclose all funds received and campaign expenses. However, there is no estab-
lished limit to private financing or election expenses, nor there is regulation to exercise 
public accountability of the campaigns, which gives leeway for “large donations by 
wealthy individuals in exchange for promises to protect their interests or for places on 
the party list, thus more generally turning the country into a plutocracy” (Nickson 
2010, 296). This laxity of rules concerning funding of parties and candidates impact 
negatively on the intended equal opportunities for electoral competition that would 
result in the election of representative authorities, which makes economic power the 
main determinant of the possibility to compete and ultimately limits transparency and 
fairness. 
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All political parties receive public funding directly and indirectly; annual contribu-
tions depend on the results of the last general elections, while electoral subsidies are 
awarded according to the amount of votes obtained (Law 834/96, Art. 276). In addi-
tion, it is allowed the use of State media for electoral messages. Also, political parties 
can obtain private financing as long as they justify the origin of their contributions, only 
banning reception of funds from any State office, autonomous or independent decen-
tralized entities, mixed-economy companies, bi-national entities, companies that pro-
vide services or supplies to the State, foreign entities or individuals, unions, business 
associations or organizations representing any economic sector, or from individual con-
tributions that surpass the equivalent of five thousand minimum wages (Law 834/96, 
Art. 282). This possibility to obtain private financial support without restrictions other 
than those mentioned above bind electoral competition to economic power, so finan-
cial strength becomes more decisive than programmatic differentiation. 
A key part of the competition determined by the difference in resources is the one 
related to electoral campaigns. The law establishes freedom to campaign and indicates 
that there will be free access to three per cent of daily spaces in all mass media outlets 
for the dissemination of the programs, during ten days prior the closing of the electoral 
campaign (Law 834/96, Art. 302). However, such free space must be shared by all com-
peting options, so it fails to meet the intended function to effectively promote all par-
ties or candidates as they increase in number.  
At the same time, private media in Paraguay has played a key role determining the 
main trends of public opinion. Media coverage generally favors parties and candidates 
with better resources and those who share political interests with the media owners. 
Since the number of owners is limited (López and Zárate 2015) and the media is highly 
concentrated in “seven groupings dominating the newspaper industry, television, and 
to a lesser extent, radio” (Nickson 2010, 290), dissemination of information and the 
framing of key issues are near monolithic.8 Thus, while the electoral legislation tries to 
establish certain parameters of fairness for the competition, the results are still linked 
to prior advantages that some political parties maintain in terms of funding, access to 
State resources and relationships with the owners of private media. 
 
8 There is scarce access to pluralistic sources of information, which is not limited to electoral periods. It 
has been argued that “six of the seven groupings are controlled by families whose fortunes were made 
through close links with the Stroessner regime” and who remain among the richest individuals in the coun-
try (Nickson 2010, 291). The situation is worsened by the precarious working conditions of journalists, who 
opt for self-censorship in order to avoid disagreements with their employers and keep their jobs (López 
and Zárate 2015). 
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This situation facilitates the perpetuation of the traditional political interests in gov-
ernment in detriment of marginalized social sectors that, although may account to an 
important electoral force on their own, are not able to access electoral competition in 
order to engage politically with the rest of the population. Limited access to public of-
fice, in turn, configures a type of system of low democratic accountability where “the 
delegative element overshadows the representative one” (O'Donnell 1994, 61). 
 
 
5. Substantive representation 
 
Elected authorities maintain independence to rule and to enact policies given the 
absence of imperative mandate in democratic systems, so the exercise of representa-
tive government requires them to act consciously on behalf of the people and in ac-
cordance with their interests (Manin 1992). Although substantive representation does 
not necessarily require excluded social groups to access decision making instances to 
protect their interests (Pitkin 1967), it implies that democratic elected officials should 
not act in a manner that conflicts with the people's preferences unless it's justified in 
terms of their objective interests, or without a clear explanation of why their positions 
differ. 
The problem of political representation increases in complexity when taking into 
consideration the social heterogeneity in Paraguay and the weakness that characteriz-
es civil society. Benjamín Arditi and José Rodríguez (1987) already addressed this issue 
when analyzing the dictatorial government, indicating that society as a whole –and cul-
tural minorities in particular– lacked any real impact in the political agenda or the im-
plementation of public policies. Diego Abente-Brun has also contended that the organi-
zation of popular interests faced structural challenges in Paraguay, as the rather tradi-
tional socioeconomic structure of the country “hinders the emergence of collective ac-
tors capable of developing a collective identity and thus of making a universalistic im-
pact on the political process” and that the “lack of social articulation in a large part of 
the population favors the emergence of clientelistic politics” (Abente-Brun 2007, 16), 
constraining the development of social citizenship in Paraguay.  
Although democratization changed the potential power of social collectives for 
agenda setting through electoral competition or unconventional participation –to en-
gage in societal accountability “by exposing and denouncing wrongdoing”, imposing 
“symbolic sanctions” or as a means to “activate the operation of horizontal mecha-
nisms” (Smulovitz and Peruzzotti 2000, 152)–, minorities are still discriminated against 
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politically despite the State's responsibility to guarantee equal rights to the people.9 In 
this sense women, rural communities and indigenous communities appear to be social 
groups that have not achieved substantive representation in Paraguayan democracy, as 
their interests have remained unprotected by the different parties that have had ac-
cess to executive and legislative posts throughout the democratization period, either at 
national or local level. 
In what comes to women, their inclusion to the Paraguayan political arena in terms 
of gender equality is a pending issue. While it's been asserted that women have equal 
civil, political, social, economic and cultural rights as men, and that the State is respon-
sible for promoting the conditions to make equality effective (National Constitution, 
Art. 48), the first barrier to women's political participation relates to the lack of imple-
mentation of public policies aimed towards alleviating historical disparities among 
genders.10 The legislation establishes a quota system that indicates that one in every 
five candidates in primary elections should be a woman (Law 834/96, Art. 32), although 
there are no established rules about placement of candidates in the lists and each par-
ty or movement is free to set the order of precedence. There are no set quota re-
quirements for closed lists that compete at the national or municipal level, although 
some political parties implement them voluntarily, generally establishing a 30% quota 
for women on their electoral lists (Pereira and González 2008).  
Furthermore, it has been claimed that such quotas don't reflect the country's politi-
cal reality, where women lead the work done with the political bases: “it's really amaz-
ing how women are organized throughout the country, in rural as well as in urban are-
as (they say there are more than five thousand women organizations nationwide)” and 
“grassroots mobilization rests on the shoulders of women and they are the ones that 
move the whole community” (Schvartzman, 2012). Thus, while it's perceived that polit-
ical groundwork is carried out largely by women and that there's assimilation of a par-
 
9 The Paraguayan State has been historically weak and the provision of social welfare has been linked to 
the work of the ANR party since the dictatorial period, which also gives this party comparative advantage 
in electoral terms.  
10 A recent salient example of discriminatory policy enacted by the government towards women relates 
to the legislation that regulates domestic work (Law 5407/15), an economic activity typically done by 
women. Enacted in response to years of activism of social organizations representative of such interests 
(Maciel and Zub Centeno 2015), this law made progress in the protection of labor rights for domestic 
workers such as the right to retire with a pension, to work up to eight hours a day, to rest on weekends 
and holidays, to get paid for working overtime, to achieve job stability, to unionize, as well as banning em-
ployment of children, among others. However, while this law established for the first time a legal refer-
ence for the salary appropriate for domestic work, it states that it's worth only 60% of the national mini-
mum wage. 
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ticipatory political culture among women collectives in the whole country, their im-
portance doesn't translate to the competition level. As a result, in the last general elec-
tions women achieved only 18% of seats in Chamber of Deputies and 20% in the Sen-
ate, while in the latest municipal elections only 26 out of 250 new majors elected were 
women,11 accounting for 10.4% of the total. 
Another social group that has not been able to achieve substantive representation 
concerns the indigenous people.12 Legislation contains provisions for their inclusion to 
the national political life, constitutionally recognizing their cultural preeminence prior 
to the formation and organization of the Paraguayan State. Their insertion to the politi-
cal life is valued by the Constitution, as it claims to guarantee their right to participate 
in the economic, social, political and cultural life of the country, in accordance with 
their customary uses as well as the national laws (National Constitution, Art. 65). Indig-
enous representatives are legally capable to join the electoral process and compete to 
achieve public office, either by organizing their own political movements or by promot-
ing participation of their members in existing political parties that could acknowledge 
indigenous demands as their own. In spite of such institutional intent, however, the 
electoral praxis remains alien to the world view of indigenous peoples in Paraguay giv-
en that they don't assimilate the idea of the national State as their own, as it is a for-
eign structure to them (Gómez 2012).  
Similar to women, indigenous communities tend to be marginalized from public poli-
cies. Until recently, social programs and poverty alleviation measures didn't contem-
plate indigenous communities as part of their focalization strategies, while policies re-
lated to land restitution –that would benefit them directly– are not implemented (Aya-
la 2015). Lack of government attention to their needs is related to the lack of self-
identification of these communities as subjects of the rule of law, given that awareness 
about their rights, on the one hand, and government accountability related to those 
rights, on the other, are a fairly new notion to them and it's not always present among 
the different communities (Gómez 2012).13 This fragmented relationship between in-
 
11 Most of these women majors belong to the traditional parties ANR and PLRA, while only two repre-
sent alternative political movements (Duarte-Recalde and González-Ríos 2016, 308). 
12 According to the National Indigenous Census of 2012 there were 117150 indigenous people living in 
Paraguay that represented 1.8% of the total population of the country. They are distributed among 19 
ethnic groups, 91.3% of which are settled in rural areas.  
13 Power structures that do have an impact on these communities are predominantly religious groups 
or organized criminal groups, the latter ones even committing acts of aggression against the people with 
total impunity (Gómez 2012). 
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digenous communities and the Paraguayan State coincides, moreover, with the lack of 
cultural understanding of the indigenous peoples by the rest of the population. 
The State recognizes the indigenous right to communal ownership of the land in suf-
ficient extension to preserve and develop their particular lifestyles; it's constitutionally 
stated that the State is responsible for the free provision of the lands, which shall be 
banned from commercial exchange and exempt from taxes (National Constitution, Art. 
64). The “Paraguayan Indigenous Institute” (INDI, in its Spanish initials) is the institution 
responsible for safeguarding the interests of indigenous communities, which include 
procurement of the indicated land to be destined for their subsistence. However, their 
work has been obstructed by institutional errors14 as well as administrative limitations 
beyond their control. Landowners' reluctance to sell back to the State the lands origi-
nally belonging to indigenous communities adds to the lack of legislative initiatives to 
support indigenous claims of restitution, which denotes poor representation of indige-
nous fundamental needs. 
Paraguayan democracy has also failed to achieve substantive representation of rural 
communities, whose demands have been mobilized by peasant organizations. Rural 
communities have lived in poorer conditions than their urban counterparts throughout 
the democratization period15 (Nickson 2011; Duarte-Recalde 2015), remaining particu-
larly susceptible to economic shocks of an eminently agro-exporting productive struc-
ture. Although peasant grassroots movements have been politically mobilized since the 
1990s, their demands stand in opposition to those of soybean farmers represented by 
the Cámara Paraguaya de Exportadores de Cereales y Oleaginosas (CAPECO) –who also 
emerged as “a powerful stakeholder” group during the 1990s– and those of the Aso-
ciación Rural del Paraguay (ARP), an organization of cattle-ranchers with strong ties to 
the traditional parties who “have become accustomed to a high rate of return on capi-
tal as a result of noncompliance with the limited rural land taxation and the non-pay-
ment of minimum wage and social benefits to their workers” (Nickson 2010, 290).  
The breakdown of a rural subsistence economy in the country dates back to the 
1970s, which coincided with the expansion of mechanized agriculture specialized in 
cotton production; this process led to the installment of the agro-exporting business 
model as an unchallenged scheme, limiting smallholder farmers' productive autonomy 
 
14 For instance, this institution sold twenty-five thousand hectares of land belonging to the Ayoreo 
people in the year 2012. 
15 Poverty levels and income inequality remain consistently higher in Paraguayan rural areas (Duarte-
Recalde 2015); 32.49% of the rural population remained under the poverty line in 2015, compared to 
15.44% of the urban area and 22.24% of the entire country.  
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as they increasingly faced difficulties to access credit (Palau 2009).16 Their deepening 
economic vulnerability shaped their decreasing power to exercise influence over tradi-
tional political parties, whose leaderships maintained close ties with powerful stake-
holder groups, making their substantive representation through these parties a fallacy. 
Furthermore, peasant organizations are now criminalized for their activities as social 
movements that seek to enact social accountability in a democratic context.17 
Peasant movements have had prominence in setting the political agenda in recent 
years, promoting discussions about the need for land reform18, the elimination of un-
productive latifundia19 or, more recently, the use of toxic products for agriculture (Fo-
gel 2009).20 They have done so through means of unconventional participation without 
necessarily adopting anti-system stands, acknowledging the electoral process as a stra-
tegic option to achieve their goals that can be used eventually (Flecha, 2012). 
Advocating the idea that “a collectivity governs itself when decisions implemented 
on its behalf reflect the preferences of its members” (Przeworski 2010, 18), Paraguayan 
peasant movements' main objections to the electoral process relate to their perception 
 
16 Tomás Palau (2009) indicated that social conflict in the Paraguayan countryside broke out in the late 
1980s as a direct result of the decline of cotton prices on the international market, which left smallholder 
farmers without the means of subsistence.  
17 There are numerous reports of murder, torture and cruel treatment of peasant protesters as a result 
of clashes with the police. These clashes are part of the decades-long struggle for access to land in the 
county, linked to the concentration of 85.5% of agricultural land in 2.6% or farms (Palau 2009) and the ex-
istence of more than seven million hectares of ill-gotten lands –public lands distributed during the 
Stroessner regime and successive ANR governments to people who didn't qualify as beneficiaries of the 
land reform according to the Agrarian Act (CVJ 2008)–. According to the Chokokue Report of the Human 
Rights Coordinator of Paraguay, between the years 1989 and 2013, 115 members of peasant grassroots 
organizations have been executed or disappeared (CODEHUPY 2014).  
18 The Constitution declares that agrarian reform –effective incorporation of the peasant population to 
the national economic and social development– is a key factor to achieve rural well-being. In order to 
achieve the reform there shall be equitable systems of distribution, property and tenancy of the land in 
place, promotion of credit for farmers, as well as technical, educational and sanitary assistance, the crea-
tion and promotion of agricultural cooperatives and similar associations, and the production, industrializa-
tion and rationalization of the market for the integral development of the sector (National Constitution, 
Art. 114).  
19 In turn, the Constitution also states that in order to progressively eliminate unproductive latifundia, 
the law will attend to the natural aptitude of the lands, to the needs of the population linked to agriculture 
and desirable specifications for the balanced development of agriculture, farming, forestry and industrial 
activities, as well as to the sustainable use of natural resources and the preservation of ecological balance 
(National Constitution, Art. 116). 
20 Ramón Fogel (2009) finds relation between the use of such chemicals and the rising mortality rates, 
birth defects or spontaneous abortions in the are where they are applied, based on data by the Ministry of 
Public Health and Social Welfare. 
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that work done by traditional political parties doesn't reflect popular interests. Policies 
implemented by the elected governments throughout the democratization period have 
arguably intended to avoid an agrarian reform that would benefit large parts of the 
population and have supported the vested interests of agro-industrial businesses in 
detriment of those of rural families, so peasant organizations remain skeptical about 
how representative elected officials truly are. Thus, while the Paraguayan political sys-
tem's institutional design is based on democratic principles and formally allows broad 
political participation of the population in the definition of their collective destiny, 
structural and cultural inequalities with historical roots stand as barriers to the equita-
ble participation of various social sectors in the electoral process, undermining political 
equality and the principle of democratic representation contained in the system.   
 
 
6. Final remarks 
 
Democratic electoral accountability, as a mechanism of citizen control over the gov-
ernment, endures in Paraguay since 1998. While this mechanism has determined the 
procedural democratic nature of the political system, it has also allowed the continu-
ous representation of political interests established during the dictatorial regime by the 
elected governments. Not only have traditional parties and their vested interests re-
mained in control of the political system with partial turnover of political actors, but 
entire communities have remained marginalized from exercising influence over public 
policy. Thus, political citizenship remains limited in practice as social collectives face 
material and cultural constraints that inhibit their capability of taking part in the elec-
toral process, hindering the regime's democratic quality and the representative nature 
of the Paraguayan government.  
Though the institutional framework of the electoral system is based on democratic 
principles, the uneven enforcement of electoral rules allow informal practices to define 
political behavior, while lack of punishment for transgressions benefits political sectors 
accustomed to taking advantage of institutional loopholes. Practical knowledge about 
the workings of the system is supported by few limits on campaign spending and lax 
rules concerning the financing of parties and candidates, which adds to the historical  
social inequalities that ultimately limit popular access to the electoral process. Thus, 
the intended equality expressed by the institutions is not mirrored by systemic condi-
tions for equitable participation or competition. It would be fundamental to continue 
an analysis about the exercise of political power in Paraguay, besides the access to 
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power here presented, in order to further assess the way democratic representation is 
restricted through the actual workings of the State bureaucracy in this country.  
The representative quality of democracy in Paraguay is limited because citizens have 
the legal opportunity to participate in the process of promoting and electing authori-
ties but only part the population is fully able to do so. There is lack of conversion of or-
ganizational grassroots experience by women, indigenous or rural collectives into elec-
toral options. Societal accountability initiatives don't appear to be effective instru-
ments of control of public officials either, as there isn't evidence they would act out of 
fear of the penalties civil society might inflict on them beyond the electoral process. 
Hence, procedural democracy in Paraguay results in weak descriptive and substantive 
representation of the country's social heterogeneity which, in turn, results in scarce 
public policies targeted to the needs of marginalized social groups. 
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